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SCKit turns ScreenConnect sessions into an MSP compromise path — two vulnerabilities, two response tracks

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CyberSecureFox Editorial Team

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Researchers from Blackpoint Cyber and Huntress have disclosed details of an active campaign using the SCKit toolkit, targeting ConnectWise ScreenConnect deployments — a remote access platform widely used by MSPs. The campaign involves two separate vulnerabilities: the critical client-side vulnerability CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9) in ScreenConnect itself and an authentication flaw CVE-2026-127063 (CVSS 9.3) in the third-party RMM+ extension. According to Huntress, as of 11 November 2026 at least 288 affected hosts were observed across 48 organizations, and on 13 November another 205 hosts across 41 organizations. We previously covered this vulnerability in the context of VBScript payload propagation — it is now being used in a much more sophisticated toolkit.

Two vulnerabilities — two vectors

It is critically important to treat the incident as two separate vectors that require independent response measures. Updating the ScreenConnect client does not eliminate the RMM+ extension issue, and vice versa.

CVE-2026-84869: ScreenConnect client vulnerability

According to the ConnectWise advisory, the vulnerability is related to missing authorization (CWE-862) and improper privilege management (CWE-269) on the ScreenConnect client side. It allows an attacker to transfer and execute files via an active remote session without authorization or confirmation from the host. The ScreenConnect server component is not affected. Versions prior to 26.6.5 are vulnerable; a fix is available starting with version 26.6.5. The vulnerability was added to the CISA KEV catalog on 11 September 2026 with a remediation deadline of 14 September 2026 for federal agencies.

CVE-2026-127063: RMM+ authentication flaw

A separate issue affects the RMM+ third-party extension for ScreenConnect. According to the ConnectWise advisory, the extension uses a static default API secret (CWE-1392, Use of Default Credentials). Huntress reports that in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 the extension accepted a blank access key if the administrator had not configured their own, which allowed commands to be executed on managed agents while bypassing standard ScreenConnect authentication mechanisms, including multifactor authentication. RMM+ operates independently of ScreenConnect accounts, roles, and authentication controls. A patched version of RMM+ had not been released at the time of publication — ConnectWise recommends disabling the extension immediately.

How SCKit works

According to Blackpoint Cyber, the attack chain leverages the built-in Run Command functionality of the ScreenConnect platform to execute commands. The sequence includes:

  1. Checking for an existing ScreenConnect installation
  2. Downloading and launching a malicious MSI installer (sc.msi)
  3. Delivering a batch dropper script (sckit-run.bat)
  4. Contacting the command server ns.mo7sen[.]dev to fetch a PowerShell decoder (sckit-decoder.ps1)
  5. Deploying SCKit components, including installing two unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients to maintain persistent access

Commands were executed via existing ScreenConnect agents in the context of NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM, eliminating the need for a separate execution mechanism on each machine.

RelayTrap: attempted reverse propagation

The most notable SCKit component is the RelayTrap module. It attempts to use the guest-to-host file transfer technique associated with CVE-2026-84869 by replacing the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest client and sending a malicious payload back to the technician’s workstation when they connect to investigate suspicious activity. If it succeeds, the malware attempts to extract the technician’s authenticated browser sessions (the .ASPXAUTHcookie) from local data and process memory in order to spread the attack to other managed endpoints.

Critical nuance: according to both research teams, at the time of publication no successful reverse propagation to a technician workstation or bypass of the 26.6.5 patch has been observed. The session theft stage requires code execution directly on the technician’s workstation and is not a remote cookie disclosure vulnerability.

Initial access vector: an open question

The initial intrusion vector remains unconfirmed. According to Blackpoint analyst Nevan Beal, the RMM+ extension is considered a likely initial access path, but there is insufficient evidence to prove this. Blackpoint also reports that it has not found any technical linkage between disabled ConnectWise extensions and SCKit components. In its statement, ConnectWise said that a preliminary assessment suggests abuse of third-party extensions installed in partner environments. No attribution to any known threat group has been established.

Indicators of compromise

Researchers highlighted the following IOCs for detection:

Domains and URLs:

  • ns.mo7sen[.]dev
  • sc.payproofkit[.]com
  • cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com
  • soxnewwork.homedns[.]org
  • newnewnew.gotdns[.]org
  • 007[.]from-ak[.]com

IP addresses:

  • 185.99.255[.]28
  • 185.241.211[.]197
  • 155.94.150[.]39

Host artifacts: unauthorized secondary ScreenConnect clients, Run Command and Shared Toolbox activity, the C:\\ProgramData\\RelayTrap directory, generated files in the format k<32-hex>.ps1.

Response recommendations

MSPs need to run two parallel response tracks:

  1. Update ScreenConnect clients to version 26.6.5 or later on all managed endpoints. For on-premises deployments, ConnectWise recommends updating; disabling TransferFiles permissions is only a temporary measure.
  2. Immediately disable the RMM+ extension — no patched version has been released, and updating the ScreenConnect client does not eliminate the extension’s vulnerability.
  3. Audit the management infrastructure: check for unauthorized ScreenConnect Access installations, analyze the history of administrative commands, and review technician workstations and browser sessions — especially if support staff have already connected to a suspicious system.
  4. Strengthen protection of operator sessions: tighten session validation and introduce additional authentication for bulk administrative actions.

Although the full SCKit attack chain — from compromising an endpoint, to infecting the technician’s workstation, to spreading across an MSP’s entire client base — has not yet been carried out in practice, the toolkit itself demonstrates a targeted architecture for exploiting trust relationships in the managed services model. Two key actions right now: update ScreenConnect clients to 26.6.5+ and disable the RMM+ extension until a patched version is released. The investigation should cover not only endpoints but the entire management infrastructure — sessions, technician workstations, and command history.


CyberSecureFox Editorial Team

The CyberSecureFox Editorial Team covers cybersecurity news, vulnerabilities, malware campaigns, ransomware activity, AI security, cloud security, and vendor security advisories. Articles are prepared using official advisories, CVE/NVD data, CISA alerts, vendor publications, and public research reports. Content is reviewed before publication and updated when new information becomes available.

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