A national database powering Uzbekistan’s automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) system was left openly accessible on the internet, exposing millions of 4K photos and videos from road cameras together with precise GPS coordinates of each device. The incident underscores how rapidly deployed “smart” traffic systems can become high‑risk surveillance platforms when basic cybersecurity controls are missing.
Uzbekistan’s traffic camera database exposed without authentication
The open database was identified by security researcher Anurag Sen and reported to TechCrunch. According to their findings, the central traffic monitoring platform had been online since at least September 2024 and was reachable directly from the public internet with no authentication or access control. A full-featured web dashboard was accessible via a standard browser.
Uzbekistan operates roughly one hundred groups of roadside cameras in major cities and on key transport corridors. Devices are deployed in Tashkent, Jizzakh, Karshi, Namangan and on intercity highways, including sections near previously disputed border areas with Tajikistan. The system continuously scans license plates, records drivers and passengers, and automatically logs thousands of violations per day, from red‑light running and seat‑belt offences to use of unregistered vehicles.
What data was exposed and who operates the ALPR system
The exposed environment reportedly contained exact coordinates of every camera along with a vast archive of media files. Each image and video was accompanied by metadata such as timestamp, location, violation type and the recognized license plate number. In combination, these fields allow highly accurate reconstruction of movement patterns of specific individuals and vehicles over time.
The ALPR infrastructure is managed by the Public Security Department of Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. TechCrunch noted that the ministry did not respond to requests for comment, while the national incident response team UZCERT only issued an automated acknowledgement. The platform is described as an “intelligent traffic management system” built by Chinese vendor Maxvision, which supplies surveillance and security solutions across the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia.
The mix of geolocation data, high‑resolution imagery and temporal information effectively turns such a database into a powerful tracking tool. If accessed by hostile actors, it could be used to monitor officials, business leaders, journalists or foreign visitors, map their regular routes, plan surveillance and, conversely, identify blind spots to facilitate criminal activity.
Global pattern of license plate recognition system vulnerabilities
The Uzbekistan case is part of a broader trend. Earlier in 2024, Wired reported that more than 150 license plate recognition cameras in the United States were exposed online without proper protections. In another investigation, 404 Media documented how numerous cameras from major ALPR provider Flock were accessible, allowing near real‑time observation of vehicle movements.
ALPR and smart traffic systems are being deployed worldwide as core components of “smart city” strategies, promising better congestion management, automated enforcement and enhanced public safety. However, the cybersecurity posture of these systems often lags far behind their operational capabilities, creating a growing attack surface in critical urban infrastructure.
Common technical misconfigurations behind surveillance data leaks
Most exposed-camera incidents result not from sophisticated hacking, but from basic configuration failures that are well documented in industry guidance such as NIST and ENISA recommendations. Typical weaknesses include:
— Management dashboards reachable directly from the internet with no login or with default factory passwords;
— Publicly accessible databases or cloud storage buckets housing raw video and metadata;
— Lack of network segmentation, where cameras and operator consoles reside in the same flat network as internet-facing services;
— Minimal logging and monitoring, preventing timely detection of unauthorized access.
The Uzbekistan ALPR leak appears to follow this pattern: a fully functional operator dashboard was exposed as a public web application, with no VPN, firewall controls or multi-factor authentication in front of it.
Securing national surveillance and smart transport systems
To reduce cyber and privacy risks, governments and smart city operators must treat ALPR and video surveillance platforms as critical infrastructure, not merely as traffic tools. At the governance level, this means enforcing mandatory security baselines, regular independent security audits and penetration tests, privacy impact assessments, and strict data retention and minimization policies.
From a technical perspective, several controls are essential:
— Hosting dashboards and databases only on internal or segmented networks, accessible via VPN with strong multi‑factor authentication;
— Applying the principle of least privilege to operator and service accounts, with role‑based access control;
— End‑to‑end encryption of data in transit and at rest, using contemporary protocols and certified cryptographic modules;
— Continuous patching of camera firmware and backend software to address known vulnerabilities;
— Ongoing external attack surface monitoring to detect exposed ports, misconfigured cloud resources and unintentionally published admin interfaces.
The exposure of Uzbekistan’s license plate recognition database demonstrates that every new “smart” camera is also a network endpoint and a potential threat vector. As ALPR and AI‑driven surveillance spread globally, security and privacy safeguards must be built in from the design stage, not bolted on later. Public authorities, technology vendors and system integrators should review existing deployments, close open interfaces, and adopt security‑by‑design and zero‑trust principles to ensure that smart city infrastructure enhances safety without turning into an easily exploitable mass surveillance grid.
