Open VSX Introduces Pre-Publication Security Scanning for VS Code Extensions

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The Open VSX extension registry, maintained by the Eclipse Foundation, is introducing automated, pre-publication security scanning for Visual Studio Code extensions. The initiative aims to reduce software supply chain risks and prevent malicious VS Code extensions from reaching developer workstations and enterprise environments.

Why VS Code Extension Security Is Now a Supply Chain Priority

Extensions for Microsoft Visual Studio Code have become a critical part of the modern software development toolchain. These plugins often have access to source code, build tooling, developer credentials, and even internal infrastructure via integrated workflows. As a result, a compromised extension can effectively bypass traditional perimeter defenses and grant attackers privileged access to development systems.

Over the past few years, attackers have increasingly targeted package registries and marketplaces such as npm, PyPI, and the Visual Studio extension ecosystem. Common techniques include typosquatting (publishing packages with names that closely resemble popular ones), injecting malicious logic into widely used libraries, and abusing stolen publisher accounts to distribute backdoored updates.

Open VSX has already experienced these risks in practice. Security analysts at Socket reported an incident in which a compromised publisher account was used to upload the GlassWorm malware to the registry. The case illustrated how even open and actively curated ecosystems can be abused as distribution channels for supply chain attacks.

From Reactive Cleanup to Proactive Defense in Open VSX

Historically, Open VSX security was largely reactive: malicious or policy-violating extensions were removed after user reports, community investigation, or external research findings. While this cleanup process remains necessary, it does not scale well in an ecosystem with rapidly growing numbers of extensions and increasingly sophisticated adversaries.

To address this, the Eclipse Foundation is shifting to a proactive security model. Every new extension uploaded to Open VSX will undergo automated verification before it is made available to users. Extensions that trigger risk signals will not be immediately published; instead, they will be placed in a quarantine state for further manual or automated analysis.

Threats Targeted by the New VS Code Extension Scanning

The new verification pipeline is designed to detect common patterns associated with software supply chain attacks against IDE ecosystems, including:

  • Typosquatting and brand impersonation: extensions whose names or identifiers mimic popular projects to trick users into installing the wrong package.
  • Suspicious network behavior: hidden or unusual outbound connections, callbacks to unexpected hosts, or activity inconsistent with the listed functionality.
  • Abusive file system and environment access: requests for broad access to developer files, credentials, or environment variables without clear justification.
  • Obfuscated or self-unpacking code: compression, encryption, or packing techniques frequently used to conceal malicious payloads.
  • Behavioral anomalies: runtime behavior that does not align with the extension’s declared purpose or documented features.

In practice, this creates a multi-layered filter that reduces the exposure window: the earlier anomalous behavior is detected, the fewer users are likely to install a compromised package.

Aligning Open VSX Security with Visual Studio Marketplace Practices

Microsoft already operates a comparable model in the Visual Studio Marketplace, where extensions are scanned for malicious content upon submission, reviewed again shortly after publication, and periodically rescanned in bulk. These measures have become standard in response to the rising volume of malicious or suspicious packages reported across public ecosystems by various industry studies.

By adopting pre-publication checks and quarantine workflows, Open VSX brings its security posture closer to the official Microsoft marketplace. This alignment is particularly significant for organizations that rely on Open VSX as an alternative or internal registry for VS Code extension management, including air-gapped or regulated environments.

Rollout Timeline and Impact for Developers and Organizations

The new Open VSX security verification program will be rolled out in stages to limit false positives and avoid unnecessary friction for legitimate publishers:

  • February 2026 – Observation mode: all newly submitted extensions are scanned, but publication is not blocked. This phase focuses on tuning detection rules, improving accuracy, and building feedback loops with maintainers.
  • From March 2026 – Enforcement and quarantine: extensions that trigger security alerts will be automatically quarantined until additional verification is completed.

According to Eclipse Foundation representatives, the objective is to raise the baseline of extension security while keeping the process transparent and predictable for responsible authors and enterprise users.

For extension developers, these changes highlight the need to embed secure development lifecycle (SSDLC) practices: request only the minimum required permissions, avoid opaque or unnecessary dependencies, document network interactions clearly, and use automated static and dependency analysis tools to detect vulnerabilities and suspicious behavior early.

For organizations that depend heavily on VS Code and Open VSX, the new controls should be complemented by internal governance. Recommended measures include maintaining an approved list of trusted extensions, mirroring or proxying registries, tracking extension versions, and validating sources before deployment. Combining proactive registry-side scanning with robust internal policies significantly strengthens software supply chain security and increases trust in the broader VS Code extension ecosystem.

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