At the end of January 2026, law enforcement agencies carried out one of the most significant recent strikes against ransomware infrastructure: the RAMP ransomware forum was seized and taken offline. Both the clear‑web site at ramp4u[.]io and its Tor hidden service now display a seizure notice referencing several units of the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ).
FBI Seizure of the RAMP Ransomware Forum Infrastructure
According to the banner on the seized domain, the operation involved the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and the DoJ’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS). Although a public press release was not immediately available when the banner appeared, the technical indicators align with a typical FBI domain seizure carried out in support of criminal investigations.
DNS records for ramp4u[.]io were repointed to ns1.fbi.seized.gov and ns2.fbi.seized.gov. These name servers are routinely used by U.S. authorities to host seizure notices for domains taken as evidence. This mechanism prevents further use of the domain by cybercriminals while giving law enforcement centralized control over the messaging presented to visitors.
It remains unclear whether investigators obtained full access to RAMP’s backend databases, including user accounts, private messages and transaction histories. In past operations against cybercrime forums, database access has enabled investigators to deanonymize operators, affiliates, initial access brokers and money launderers, leading to follow‑on arrests over months or even years.
Confirmation from RAMP Administrators and Criminal Forums
The loss of RAMP was publicly acknowledged on another major cybercrime forum, XSS. A former RAMP administrator using the handle Stallman confirmed that the platform had fallen under law enforcement control and described the seizure as wiping out years of work to build what RAMP branded as “the most free forum in the world.”
Such admissions matter beyond their emotional tone. For the cybercriminal community, they serve as a clear signal of compromise: once insiders confirm that a forum’s infrastructure is in the hands of law enforcement, any attempt to reuse old accounts, credentials or communication channels can dramatically increase the risk of unmasking and long‑term surveillance.
Why RAMP Mattered to the Global Ransomware Ecosystem
From DarkSide Fallout to “Last Refuge” for RaaS Operators
RAMP launched in July 2021, during a period of intense pressure on the ransomware ecosystem. After the high‑profile DarkSide attack on Colonial Pipeline in May 2021, several major Russian‑language forums banned the advertising of ransomware programs and the recruitment of partners for ransomware operations to reduce law‑enforcement attention.
In this context, RAMP positioned itself as a “last refuge” for ransomware operators and affiliates. Where others imposed restrictions, RAMP openly welcomed ransomware‑related content, including recruitment ads for ransomware‑as‑a‑service (RaaS) programs and discussions of attack methodologies.
Services Traded on RAMP: Access, Malware and Know‑How
Over time, RAMP evolved into a key hub in the ransomware value chain, particularly in the Russian‑speaking underground. Among the activities that flourished on the forum were:
— Affiliate recruitment for RaaS programs, where malware developers partnered with intrusion specialists and shared ransom proceeds.
— Sale and purchase of access to compromised corporate networks by so‑called initial access brokers, dramatically shortening the time needed to stage an attack.
— Exchange and sale of malware, exploits and lateral movement tools used to spread across victim networks and disable defenses.
— Detailed discussion of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for bypassing endpoint protection, backup systems and detection technologies.
Research from firms such as Chainalysis and Coveware has shown that RaaS and affiliate programs account for a large share of global ransomware activity, with criminal revenues measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. By lowering entry barriers and connecting specialists, forums like RAMP significantly increase the scale and speed of such operations.
Impact of the Takedown on Cybercriminals and Defenders
Short-Term Disruption and Market Fragmentation
The seizure of RAMP will not eliminate ransomware, but it does raise operational costs for attackers. Losing a large, semi‑trusted marketplace makes it harder for threat actors to:
— find new affiliates and technically skilled partners;
— trade stolen network access quickly and at scale;
— assess counterparties’ reputation through ratings, feedback and escrow services.
Past takedowns of key cybercrime platforms — such as RaidForums, Genesis Market and BreachForums — illustrate a recurring pattern: the ecosystem adapts but becomes more fragmented. Actors migrate to smaller invite‑only forums, encrypted messaging groups and private “closed clubs.” This reduces visibility for defenders but also erodes economies of scale for criminals, making coordination and growth more difficult.
What Organizations Should Do Now
For legitimate organizations, the disruption of RAMP creates a temporary window to strengthen defenses before new infrastructure fully replaces it. Effective measures against ransomware should include at minimum:
— Robust, tested backups stored offline or in immutable storage, with regular restoration drills.
— Multi‑factor authentication (MFA) for remote access, email and administrative accounts.
— Network segmentation to limit lateral movement and contain breaches.
— Patch and vulnerability management, especially for VPNs, remote access tools and internet‑facing systems.
— Security awareness training focused on phishing, malicious attachments and social engineering.
— Continuous monitoring and anomaly detection for unusual logins, privilege escalation and large data transfers.
The takedown of the RAMP ransomware forum underlines that law‑enforcement pressure on ransomware infrastructure is intensifying, but it also confirms that criminal ecosystems are resilient and adaptive. Organizations that treat this event as a catalyst to reassess their ransomware exposure, improve incident response plans and harden their environments will be far better positioned to withstand the next wave of attacks, regardless of where the cybercrime community chooses to regroup.
